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 Abstract 
 The goal of this project is to analyze a sample of Conservation Easements to 
evaluate how the benefits received compare to the value of the tax deductions given. 
Looking at 61 syndicated Conservation Easements, for every lost dollar in income tax 
only $0.52 of conservation benefit is protected. However, the Conservation Easements 
that break-even have features in common. The CEs that break even typically fall under 
$10,000 in lost income tax per acre and have a minimum acreage of 200. 
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Introduction 
Project Description 
 Conservation Easements (CEs) are agreements between a landowner and a holder, 
where the landowner donates the property’s development rights in order to protect 
ecological values of the property. Qualified CEs are eligible for an income tax deduction 
from the IRS, with this deduction equaling the opportunity cost of the development rights 
donated. However, these income tax deductions are vulnerable to abuse because they are 
rather generous. The goal of this project is to analyze a sample of CEs to evaluate how 
the benefits received compare to the value of the tax deductions given. 
Specifically, there are concerns of abuse of syndicated CEs, or CEs that are 
donated by large limited liability companies. These CEs are believed to have the highest 
income tax deductions and they have been labeled as abusive tax shelters by the IRS. 
Society has a limited amount of resources and we do not want to incentivize behavior that 
underutilizes those resources for the benefit of a specific few. In this project, I apply a 
cost vs benefit analysis method to 61 syndicated CEs in order to determine if these CEs 
have a positive present value. 
In addition to this analysis, I create a policy suggestion that is inspired by Thomas 
Hobbes’ Leviathan. In the Leviathan, Hobbes describes society as an artificial person and 
uses an extended metaphor to analyze each aspect of a country as body parts. A natural 
person is instinctively able to compare costs to utility and I lay out a policy that recreates 
that natural process for an artificial entity. In addition to this policy, I also look at one of 
the key requirements of CEs, which is for them to be in perpetuity; or in other words for  
the restrictions placed on the property to have no end date. I use Adam Smith’s The 
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Wealth of Nations as a foil for Hobbes to discuss the benefits and consequences of 
permanently fix a property’s state into the future. 
An Overview of Conservation Easements 
CEs are a tool used to prevent development on specific sections of a property. 
Congress decides that society benefits from a property remaining as is, however, the 
market rewards development, so this program incentivizes landowners to preserve the 
property. Eligible CEs result in the property owner getting an income tax deduction equal 
to the appraised value of the property’s development rights. This makes the property 
owner indifferent between developing the property to its full economic value and leaving 
the property as is. 
CEs are an unusual form of conservation because the land is still privately owned 
and maintained. This results in an odd dynamic where the property is being protected 
from its owner. The property owner gives certain rights to the holder. The holder is 
commonly a land trust who visits the property annually to determine that the agreement 
has not been breached. If there is a breach in agreement, then the holder takes the 
property owner to court and attempts to enforce the agreement civilly. 
A CE can protect different aspects of the property. The most common protections 
are scenic, ecological, and historic. For example, a restriction that prevents agriculture on 
land close to a body of water is ecological. A restriction that prevents cutting down trees 
is both ecological and scenic. And a restriction that prevents putting up a swing set is 
purely scenic. 
Not every CE is eligible for an income tax deduction. Section 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) of 
the Internal Revenue Code specifically allows conservation easement contributions, or “a 
qualified conservation contribution” as they are called in the Code. Qualifies CEs must 
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satisfy at least one of the following conservation purposes: 1) preserving land for outdoor 
recreation or education for the general public; 2) protecting a relatively natural habitat of 
fish, wildlife, or plants, or a similar ecosystem; or 3) preserving open space for a 
significant public benefit, meaning the property provides scenic views or falls under a 
government conservation plan. 
Options two and three are common justifications for CEs, as they do not require 
letting the general public onto private property like Option one does. Many CEs will be 
made for a combination of these two reasons. The strictest requirement for a CE to be 
eligible for an income tax deduction is that the CE must be written in perpetuity, meaning 
as long as the government is enforcing laws. 
Syndicated CEs and Problems with Abuse 
This project in particular will focus on syndicated CEs, or CEs donated by a large 
group of donners who split the income tax deduction amount their members. This 
decision was inspired by a number of factors, such as syndicated CEs explicitly being 
mentioned in the IRS “Dirty Dozen” and by the introduction of The Charitable 
Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act. Syndicated CEs ripe for abuse and 
important to study. 
Adam Looney Paper 
In “Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements,” Adam Looney 
expresses concerns about abuses with both syndicated and non-syndicated CEs.  Looney 
has the following worries: 1) donations are concentrated and transactions seem unrelated 
to benefits1; 2) a small handful of organizations are responsible for a large majority of 
donations2; 3) most organizations that devise donations of easements do not report them 
 
1 Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements pg. 3 
2 Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements pg. 4 
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as gifts or revenues on their public tax returns3; and 4) donations of “partial interests” are 
difficult to administer4.  
For his first concern, he claims that donations are mainly located in a few, 
expensive areas and income tax dollars awarded are unrelated to conservation benefits. he 
talks about how roughly 10 percent of the acreage under easement claims about 69 
percent of all tax benefits2, largely because the valuation of the easements (per 
transaction or on a per-acre basis) is unusually high. He believes that large real estate 
developments in high-cost areas tend to receive the largest amount of income tax 
deductions. 
For his second concern, he points out “between 2010 and 2012, 25 organizations 
(of about 1,700 land trusts nationwide) received about half of all donations of easements, 
measured in dollar value2.” He states that he has trust in some of the larger, transparent 
land trusts, however many of these 25 organizations have" few employees and scarce 
management or enforcement resources." 
He goes on to express concern about the lack of transparency, saying that these 
organizations report the value of these donations at zero and if they did report the 
appraised value of the CE as a gift, several land trusts would "rank among the nation's 
100 largest, non-hospital, non-university charitable organizations2."  
Looney’s final concern is that CEs themselves are particularly prone to abuse 
because CEs are unusual because the donation of CE only transfers some rights and not 
all rights. Taxpayers and the IRS argue over the method on how to value the potential lost 
 
3 Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements pg. 5 
4 Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements pg. 6 
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on a property. This leads to an attempt at an estimation of value and "some donations of 
easements benefit[ing] donors more than they further conservation causes5." 
Specifically, on syndicated CEs, Looney claims that syndications are being promoted 
as an easy way to profit. He analyzes two  sets of promotional materials which advertise 
syndicated CEs. The first is targeted to “landowners, developers, accountants, attorneys, 
appraisers, land-use consultants, financial planners, and wildlife resource managers” with 
the purpose of turning the easement into a source of asset liquidation. The second 
document provides an example of the most commonly offered benefit for those who buy 
into this plan, a substantial return in the form of a deduction for further investments in 
other real estate. Investors are offered to buy one of 99 lots for just $36,000 and are 
promised a return of $158,000 in charitable deductions5. In total the 99 lots would result 
in $15.6 million in tax deductions for only $3.6 million worth of land. 
In order to address some of these issues Looney offers multiple solutions such as a 
mandatory increase in reporting and the implementation of a stronger definition to 
“conservation value.” To increase transparency, Looney wants land trusts to be required 
to report the monetary value of CEs to their public tax record. He also suggests increasing 
minimum standards for what constitutes a valid CE to increase public benefit. 
These are fairly straightforward suggestions; however, others are more radical. He 
suggests requiring CEs to be preapproved by an outside board before any tax awards can 
be granted6. He also suggests implementing a new system where land trusts receive tax 
credits that they can award to land trusts. This would solve the issue of land trusts placing 
CEs on properties with low ecological value because land trusts would be responsible for 
budgeting their credits responsibly. And even if a CE is placed, Looney does not want 
 
5 Looney, Charitable Contributions of Conservation Easements pg. 21 
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landowners to be awarded the full market value of their development rights. “Donors 
could receive credits of up to a maximum of 50 percent of the fair market value of the 
contributed easement and could use the credits to offset up to 100% of their income tax 
liability.” 
Government Attention to Syndicated Conservation CEs 
 The IRS releases an annual list of tax scams for consumers to be wary of called 
the “Dirty Dozen.” For multiple years the IRS has warned consumers to be careful with 
abusive tax shelters, however, in 2019 the IRS added language in the abusive tax shelter 
section explicitly mentioning syndicated CEs as an example. 
Abusive Tax Shelters: Abusive tax structures including trusts and syndicated 
conservation easements are sometimes used to avoid paying taxes. The IRS is 
committed to stopping complex tax avoidance schemes and the people who create 
and sell them. The vast majority of taxpayers pay their fair share, and everyone 
should be on the lookout for people peddling tax shelters that sound too good to 
be true. When in doubt, taxpayers should seek an independent opinion regarding 
complex products they are offered (IRS “Dirty Dozen” 2019) 
 
Syndicated CEs are a recognized problem; however, it is a problem that the 
government is working to address. On March 29th, 2019 The Charitable Conservation 
Easement Program Integrity Act of 20197 was introduced in The House of 
Representatives and then referred to the House’s Ways and Means Committee. This bill 
aims amend the IRS code to limit the amount of the income tax deduction to 2.5 times 
“the partner's adjusted basis in the partnership” for the first 3 taxable years after the 
individual joins the partnership. 
Representative Mike Thompson of California introduced this bill for himself and for 
Representative Mike Kelley of Pennsylvania. This bill has bipartisan support as 
 
6 This is already done in some states, however, Looney is suggesting implementing this nation wide. 
7 U.S. Congress, House, Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2019, HR1992, 116th 
Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House March 29, 2019 
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Thompson is a Democrat and Kelley is a Republican. 27 other representatives 
cosponsored this bill, with 22 being democrats and 5 being republicans. As of writing, the 
last representative to cosponsor did so on March 12th, 2020. However, this bill has been 
introduced in 20178 and in 20189 by these same two representatives with no success, so 
while an interesting solution, it is debatable that this will have any impact. 
Solutions 
This bill will help limit the damage done by syndicated CEs, however, it seems like 
an attempt to put a bandage on the problem rather than treat the underlying wound. 
Looney’s suggestions have some flaws, however, he is thinking about this the right way. 
The current policy is not working and is ripe for abuse. However, I do not believe that 
abuse is the only problem we should be focusing on. We need a policy that results in 
society getting the benefits that it is paying for and that prevents us from overpaying for 
low value CEs. 
The reason that I do not like Looney’s suggestion of implementing a tax credit system 
for land trusts to budget CEs is because it will result in great properties not getting 
protected because of a budgeting constraint. He does not solve the underlying problems 
that make CEs a bad investment for society. An investment is bad for society when we 
overpay for the benefits we receive. In the case of CEs, it is particularly easy to make a 
bad investment because the value is difficult to conceptualize. The cost to society is 
determined by the market value of the property, which is easy to quantify, and the benefit 
is the ecological value, which is difficult to quantify. In order to ensure society is 
 
8 U.S. Congress, House, Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2017, HR4459, 115th 
Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House November 28, 2017 
9 U.S. Congress. Senate. Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2018. 
S. 2436. 115th Cong., 2d sess. Introduced in Senate February 15, 2018. 
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benefiting from the placement of a CE, we need a method to compare these differences in 
value to ensure a fair exchange.  
 9 
Philosophy and Policy 
 The current policies around CEs ignore the weight of permanently fixing 
something into the future. CEs are written in perpetuity, meaning there is no undoing the 
transaction and almost no method for amending the restrictions. As a result, I aim to 
create a policy which proactively addresses the issues CEs face because there is no 
possible method for retroactively addressing them. 
 Hobbes10 is a fitting philosopher to use to analyze CEs because CEs attempt to 
prevent unwanted change the same way Hobbes’ Leviathan uses the sovereign to fix the 
commonwealth into its current place. Hobbes would be sympathetic to CEs as a project 
and I believe using Hobbes to analyze CEs can teach us some lessons on how to improve 
the policy. 
Summary of Hobbes 
Artificial Personhood 
Artificial personhood is the basis for all of Hobbes’ project since he views the 
Leviathan, an artificial person, as the basis for fixing the future into a state of peace. In 
Chapter XVI, Hobbes distinguishes between a natural and an artificial person: “When 
they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when they are 
considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or 
Artificiall person11.” Artificial persons have the authority to act on behalf of those they 
represent, while a natural person simply represents himself. The Leviathan is an artificial 
person that represents members of the commonwealth, so it has the ability to act on 
society’s behalf. 
 
10 Hobbes would be most concerned with defining who the sovereign is and where their authority comes 
from rather than analyzing a specific part of the government’s structure, however, my project focuses on 
using Hobbes as a practical application for solving the policy issues concerning CEs. 
11 Hobbes Chapter XVI, Person Naturall, And Artificiall 
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Hobbes’ Account of The Will 
Both the natural and artifical person need a will in order to have the ability to act. 
In Chapter VI Hobbes gives his definition for what the will is. Hobbes describes the will 
as an end to Deliberation and he says that “Beasts that have Deliberation must necessarily 
also have Will.” He describes deliberation as a state of back and forth decision making 
over a choice where “sometimes we have an Appetite to it, sometimes an Aversion from 
it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it12.” 
When making a choice people often go back and forth on what choice they are 
going to make; they get stuck on the pros and cons and get caught in a loop in this 
deliberation period. Hobbes defines the will as the cutoff to this deliberation period, or 
“in Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, or 
to the omission thereof13.” 
Say you were stuck on whether or not to accept a new job offer. When you are 
deliberating you will be examining the pros and cons: the pay at this job is higher than 
your current job, but you want to be loyal to the job you have had for so long, but this 
new opportunity affords you better benefits, but what about the opportunities you 
currently have, etc., etc., etc. The will is the cutoff point and the decision you end up 
making: the new job asks you to decide by a certain period and you turn it down. You 
ended your deliberation and you end on the last choice you were deliberating on, not 
taking the job. 
This account of the will is important to Hobbes because the Sovereign is the 
Leviathan’s will. Since the Leviathan is an artificial person, it cannot act without a brain 
 
12 Hobbes Chapter VI, Pleasures Of Sense; Pleasures Of The Mind; Joy Paine Griefe 
13 Hobbes Chapter VI, The Will 
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of sorts. The Sovereign fills that role and acts for the commonwealth. The Sovereign can 
react to change, make new decisions, and hedge our bets to stay out of the state of nature.  
Fixing the Future into Place 
Hobbes is someone who would be sympathetic to CEs because his entire goal in 
the Leviathan is to fix the future into a position that is better than the state of nature. He 
has seen what the state of nature is like and how people are when they are at war with one 
another; the Leviathan is his solution to escape that state and to keep the future fixed in a 
way where society continues to avoid returning to it. 
As a contractarian, Hobbes uses contracts to fix the future. In Chapter XIV, 
Hobbes defines a contract as “the mutuall transferring of Right14.” Contracts can address 
a current transaction or a future one, where one party fulfills their end of the bargain now 
and the other follows through on their end at a later date. 
Contracts by their nature are artificial bonds were individuals promise to stick 
with the original agreement. In nature, people break promises. If I enter into a contract 
with someone else and they already fulfilled their end of the bargain, I am capable of 
walking away and breaking my promise. If I did that, I would be a fool to Hobbes 
because I would be putting the entire enterprise at risk for my own short-term benefit. If 
everyone starts to break their contracts, then all of society falls and we revisit the war of 
all against all. 
Part I: CEs and the Future 
 The main focus on this project will be parts II and III on the valuation issues, 
however, Hobbes, would be more concerned with the perpetuity question over the 
valuation question. Hobbes’ goal is to fix the present state of peace into place for the 
future so that we do not return to the war of all against all. CEs serve as an example of 
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what the weaknesses of a permanent and inflexible restriction into the future can look 
like. 
 The valuation question is a straightforward application of Hobbes’ logic and 
utilizes the strengths of his thinking to untie our hands around the current policy. Since 
this policy is artificial, the sovereign can change it whenever in order to ensure the 
desired outcome is achieved. However, the perpetuity question will limit our options for 
land use into the future, so whatever decision we make in the present has to be a bet we 
are confident on in every set of circumstances. That likely is an impossible task and we 
need to look for tools to adapt to changing conditions to increase our odds of success. 
How CEs Fix the Future into Place 
CEs are contracts where the IRS pays immediately in income tax deductions and 
the property owner pays over time by permanently losing the ability to develop the 
property. What is particularly interesting about CEs, is that it is not just the original 
property owner that has to fulfill this contract, but every property owner after them. They 
are written in perpetuity, meaning the restrictions have no end date. And the IRS only 
pays the first property owner. If one person places a CE on her property and she moves, 
she does not take the CE with her; the person who purchases the property after her 
purchases it without the development rights.  
No property owner, not the original one nor any after her, can remove this 
contract. The only non-disputable way, under current law, is to remove a CE from a 
property is through eminent domain, a power granted to the US government by the 5th 
amendment to take private property and convert it for public use if just compensation is 
awarded to the private land owner. 
 
14 Hobbes Chapter XIV, Contract What 
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Eminent domain can be used to remove CE development restrictions to develop a 
public benefit, for example a highway. But there is something odd about needing to use a 
constitutional power to create a public benefit by removing a CE, which is supposed to be 
placed for public benefit. Perhaps this can be attributed to what the government decides 
people need more at the time, scenic views and nature preservation or a highway. Or 
perhaps there is a disconnect between the original goal of the CE, to provide public 
benefit by protecting nature, and the perception of CEs, as a nuisance that leaves land 
inefficient. 
Trading off Stability for Flexibility— The Problem with Perpetuity 
 Hobbes aims to fix the future into place using contracts since contracts offer the 
most stability. For that reason, he would like the perpetuity rule because perpetuity, by its 
definition, leaves the CE restrictions permanent and therefore stable. There is no 
flexibility to adapt if the current restrictions are inefficient to fulfill society’s goals15. 
Hobbes may potentially view the eminent domain power as enough to prevent CEs from 
being too limiting, however, Hobbes is willing to overpay to avoid risking an unstable 
future. Adam Smith serves as a great foil to Hobbes in this aspect because Smith 
absolutely hates limiting the potential of resources and is willing to overpay to leave 
room for flexibility. 
 In Chapter II in Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, Smith shows us what a potential 
future looks like if we implement a permanent solution with no room to adjust. After the 
fall of the Roman empire, the region was in chaos. People were living in poverty and 
 
15 Currently the State Attorney General can grant a change to a CE’s restrictions, but that is rare. 
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towns were deserted. In order to protect themselves, people started living together on 
large properties and very few leaders owned large collections of the region’s property16. 
This led to the laws of primogeniture, and entails. The law of primogeniture 
allows the property to only be inherited by the family’s eldest son. Entails made it so the 
property could not be split up to anyone outside of the family. The combination of these 
two laws resulted in the property never being split up. 
 Both of these rules were made with the goal of keeping the property large and, 
therefore, safe. “The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner 
could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to 
ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions 
of its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place16.” 
 These rules were reasonable at the time of their creation because of the 
circumstances at the time, however, Smith warns that “Laws frequently continue in force 
long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone 
render them reasonable, are no more16.” At the time Smith is writing the Wealth of 
Nations, these massive properties are no longer reasonable, but rather a waste of valuable 
resources. 
 The law of primogeniture only allows the eldest son to inherit the property, so he 
is enriched while any siblings he has are left to beg. What is worse for Smith is the policy 
of entails, because that leaves the owner with a massive property that he cannot possibly 
utilize to its fullest economic potential. Rather than allow the landowner to benefit by 
selling the land to someone who can use it more efficiently, entails require that the land 
stay with its owner and sit unused. 
 
16 Smith Chapter II, Of The Discouragement of Agriculture in The Ancient State of Europe, After The Fall 
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 This problem arose because, as a solution for a current problem, restrictions were 
placed on these properties. “The possibility of their being divided again was as much as 
possible precluded for ever16”. Smith is concerned that placing a permanent solution on 
an asset, particularly on a piece of land, will lead to its underutilization for years to come. 
 Smith’s concerns are very possible for CEs. These restrictions make sense now, 
but we have no way of knowing if they will make sense forever. Hobbes’ Leviathan 
works as a system because it is not tied down with no way to adapt to a changing future; 
it is an artificial person who can use its will to make new decisions as conditions change. 
CEs as dead contracts cannot. 
Hobbes would address these concerns through the sovereign; the sovereign can 
look at the facts of the situation and remove a set of permanent restrictions when 
necessary. Smith is more concerned with preventing inefficiencies than fixing the future 
into place and takes peace for granted. The market needs room to allocate resources 
efficiently and any permanent restrictions place administrative huddles in the way that do 
not need to be there. Smith is not as loyal to ensuring permanence the way Hobbes is, but 
rather he wants to prevent artificial rules from creating inefficiencies. Smith places his 
faith in an invisible hand while Hobbes stresses the necessity of a visible one. 
The Relationship Between the Will and the Future 
I believe that anything which hopes to fix the future into place needs to have a 
will of some kind. Though the future does not exist yet, it is more likely to change than it 
is to stay the same. If that were not the case, then Hobbes’ entire project would be 
unnecessary. Fixing the future into place is important because there are a number of 
potential futures that leave us worse off than the state we are in presently, however, 
Hobbes’ system has room to adapt to changing conditions. 
 
Of The Roman Empire. 
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The leviathan has a will guiding what actions it takes, a natural person at its helm 
who can exercise discretion when conditions change. The leviathan is alive in a way that 
CEs are not. CEs are a dead contract with almost non-existent room for change. Both the 
leviathan and a CE are bets into the future; however, the leviathan is a much more 
reliable bet than a dead contract. If we were to place bets on if I were to win a game of 
football, I would be more willing to bet on myself if I had the ability to move my feet. If 
my shoes are glued to the floor, then eventually the opposing team will defeat me. 
Though I have no policy solution for the issues concerning perpetuity, clearly CEs 
will get left behind if they have no room to adapt. Though we want stability we cannot 
glue something’s condition into place and leave it defenseless. Of course, this still 
ignores that the initial decision as to who will be on the court is the most important. Once 
we have a player on the payroll, we have already paid to place them on the team. If they 
are not a strong contender and we never put them in the match, then we wasted resources 
recruiting them only to never utilize them. The questions around the future focus on what 
to do with resources once we have them, so we also need to decide what CEs we will and 
will not pay for. 
 
Part II: CEs and The IRS as an Artificial Person  
The analysis in this section looks for inspiration to improve the policy by 
considering the artificial personhood of the IRS. An artificial person is an entity with the 
ability to make decisions for natural persons, however, the artificial person will have a 
natural person at the helm making decisions. This is important because if the artificial 
person is going to be capable of making decisions for a natural person, it needs to have 
comparable tools to a natural person— if not superior ones. This section looks at what 
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tools a natural person uses when making decisions so we can artificially recreate these 
tools as policy in the next part. 
The Goal of CEs 
When fixing some condition into the future there has to be a purpose. With 
society as a whole that purpose is obvious for Hobbes; his goal is to fix society into place 
to avoid the war of all against all. For CEs, the goal can be different depending on who is 
asked. Obviously, the goal is to preserve something, but there is some debate as to what 
that something is. A few possibilities of what CEs aim to preserve include the ecological 
benefits of the land, the overall aesthetic of the land, or preserving some historic 
landmark; or, sometimes, a CE can simply aim to fix the condition of the land into place 
for the sake of the current owners. 
For the sake of this discussion, I am going to assume that CEs are attempting to 
preserve the ecological benefits of the land since it makes discussing the policy more 
straightforward. However, it is important to note that whatever the goal of a CE is affects 
the policy around the CE system. If the goal is to preserve the aesthetic of the land, then 
changes can be made to the property, even if they are ecologically harmful, so long as the 
property retains its overall visual composition. If the goal is to preserve a historic 
landmark or building, then it is likely necessary to do some physical maintenance on the 
property in order to keep the property in the most pristine condition possible. 
The most concerning one of these goals is if the goal is to fix the condition of the 
land into place for the sake of the current owners and allow for no changes to prove this 
point. Sacrifices must be made in order to allow for this goal to be fulfilled. Particularly, 
if the property can be used for something of a higher value than its preserved state allows 
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for this goal would close off that possibility. The one thing that is certain about the future 
is that the state of things will change, so this bet is a particularly dangerous one. It does 
not allow for any adaptation in policy to increase society’s odds of getting a better payoff 
from this property. 
As I said earlier, I will make all policy suggestions based on the assumption that 
the goal of CEs is to preserve ecological benefits. My policy suggestions will fall short if 
that is not the goal that the US federal government chooses. It may be necessary for there 
to be different kinds of CEs with different policies surrounding them. My policy 
suggestions will only work if a property’s value can be quantified in some way. However, 
it is difficult to quantify the benefit of scenic views, historic landmarks, or the protection 
of endangered species. This is all important to keep in mind as it creates a limited set of 
circumstances where my policy suggestions will be effective. 
Implementing a Will in the Conservation Easement Approval Process 
Currently, this process works as if the IRS is signing a blank check to property 
owners if its guidelines have been followed. Land trusts find properties and make sure 
that these properties follow the IRS’ guidelines, then the IRS goes through the courts 
retroactively if there is some issue concerning fraud. Congress passed legislation 
allowing for CEs and they insisted on perpetuity and a variety of these other key aspects. 
The IRS then developed their guidelines and practices based off of Congress’ legislation. 
What I am proposing is that the congress gives the IRS the ability to reject CEs 
that cause society to overpay for the ecological value of that property, even if the CE is 
otherwise valid under the IRS’ guidelines. Congress can pass new legislation to give the 
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IRS the ability to reject CEs when the income tax deduction exceeds the benefits of 
preserving the property, even if those CEs are valid according to the current guidelines. 
To put this more simply, when you are shopping at a store it is very unlikely that 
you will deal with issues concerning fraud. For example, typically every item for sale 
comes from legitimate sources and has no legal issues whatsoever. Even then, as a 
consumer you still need to look at the prices of what you intend to buy. If a box of 
cookies is $20, it is perfectly reasonable for a consumer to not buy them because they 
view that as a higher price than the item is worth. A rational consumer will compare the 
value to what they are receiving to the price that is being charged and decide accordingly. 
Currently, the IRS is buying the development rights of properties by offering 
income tax breaks. This means that the IRS is reducing the government’s cash flow by 
accepting these CEs and they are allowing for the possibility of overpayment by not 
comparing the value of the CEs to the price. And, more importantly, they are not 
overpaying on their behalf alone but rather on behalf of the American people. 
Now, most consumers run the numbers internally. We have some intrinsic sense 
of what value $20 has to us and what value we get out of eating cookies. However, as an 
artificial entity, the IRS does not have the capability to run these numbers 
subconsciously. So, it is necessary for us to create a model which can copy a person’s 
ability to intrinsically run these calculations. 
Cost vs Benefit: The Difference Between Market Value vs Ecological Value in CEs 
When a consumer wants to buy a good, they measure the value they get from the 
good against the price. Economists call the value from the good utiles, which serves as a 
measure of the utility the consumer gets from the good. So, if a consumer was deciding 
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between buying two goods (goods A and B), the result of their decision-making process 
will look like this: 
Dua 
> 
Dub 
Pa Pb 
 
The ratio of the benefit of buying the next unit of good A over the price is greater 
than the same ratio for good B. Assuming this consumer is rational, meaning that they 
aim to maximize their own utility, the consumer will buy good A rather than good B. 
Going back to the cookie analogy, an economics professor teaching an introductory 
course would assign some arbitrary units to the value the consumer got from cookie A 
and cookie B to prove this point. Cookie A costs $2 and provides 30 utiles; cookie B 
costs $6 and provides 60 utiles; 15 is greater than 10, therefore the consumer will buy 
cookie A.  
The goal of this project is to outline a way the IRS can turn this concept into a 
policy that can be applied to future CEs. The first problem that needs to be overcome is 
that the numbers in the previous example were, as mentioned before, arbitrary. A real 
person is able to run this calculation internally based on their preferences. The IRS is not 
a real person, but an artificial entity. In order to recreate a natural process inside of an 
artificial entity, we need to establish some values that are not arbitrary. 
To base a policy around this calculation we need to answer two questions: first, 
what can we consider as a maximization of the IRS’s “utility” in a CE transaction; and 
second, what is the cost? The cost is the easier of the two to questions to answer, it is 
simply the value of the income tax deduction. This is not necessarily a dollar amount 
paid, but a reduction in cash flows and an opportunity cost of what could have been done 
with those tax dollars. 
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The first question is a little misleading, as this policy does not consider the IRS’ 
utility, but rather society’s utility as interpreted by the IRS. The purpose of the 
government accepting any kind of donation is to benefit society as a whole. A definition 
for society’s utility would have to come in the form of guidance from Congress. 
However, we know that society’s utility would be based off of the ecological values that 
are protected by the easement. 
Part III: Policy Suggestions 
How Hobbes Inspires Policy 
To summarize Hobbes, there is an artificial person who makes decisions for a 
natural person using its will. This artificial person is the government who we give the 
authority to dictate society’s rules so that we can avoid conflict. The government’s will is 
the sovereign. In the United States it is not perfectly clear exactly who the sovereign is 
since our government’s power is divided. There are artificial entities with the ability to 
make decisions on how other artificial entities act. In the case of CEs, what the IRS has 
the authority to do as an artificial person is dictated by Congress.  
When analyzing problems in policy, sometimes we cling to how things currently 
function. We forget that policy is artificial, and it can be radically changed at any time by 
the sovereign. We also forget that artificial decision making is possible because artificial 
entities have the authority to decide for natural persons, so a natural person’s decision-
making process serves as great inspiration for what our policy should look like. As an 
advisor to the sovereign, I can offer more efficient policy options based on a natural 
person’s decision-making processes. 
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In the next few pages, I will offer up two policy options with the goal of only 
giving tax deductions to CEs that pay for themselves. One policy is theoretically optimal, 
but costly to implement and the other cheaper to implement, but not 100% successful. 
Both stem from a cost analysis method for determining if these CEs break-even. 
A Policy which can Account for The Cost vs Benefit of CEs 
I propose that the IRS should require a CE to break even before property owners 
are given an income tax deduction, even if that CE is otherwise valid. This would reduce 
complaints of the CE system being abused for its tax benefits. 
In order to determine if a CE breaks even, the IRS would need a standardized 
model to compare these two notions of value. This project estimates a dollar amount for 
each of these values by using different documents associated with the CE and then 
creates a ratio of the societal benefits over the cost to society. This ratio offers a simple 
way of seeing if the CE pays for itself in its lifetime, or if it “breaks even.” 
 Ecological Value ≥ 1 The CE’s benefits are greater than or equal to its costs CE “breaks even” Lost Income Tax Dollars 
 Ecological Value < 1 The CE’s benefits are less than its costs CE does not “break even” Lost Income Tax Dollars 
 
Only giving an income tax break to CEs that at least break even would solve the 
issue with syndicated CEs in particular, since the worst abuses of CEs are often 
syndications. The difficulty here is quantifying those ecological benefits. Currently, all 
we have to analyze the ecological benefits of CEs are qualitative descriptions of property. 
We need a quantitative estimate on the value of some of the ecological values of these 
properties in order to make a fair policy. This will be further explained in the 
methodology section. 
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Costs of The Break-Even Policy 
Implementing Break-Even Policy is the most effective solution for overpaying for 
CEs. It prevents overly generous income tax deductions being awarded for CEs placed on 
properties without the ecological values to warrant it. However, this policy does require 
an extensive amount of labor to implement. First, there would need to be an updated 
study on the monetary value of these ecological benefits. Then, every property would 
need to be surveyed in order to determine the amount and types of ecological value. This 
work would need to be done for all potential CEs, including for the properties which the 
IRS may eventually deny an income tax deduction for. 
Now, one way to mitigate some of the overhead costs is to place the surveying on 
the shoulders of those applying for the income tax deduction. After all, these individuals 
are already responsible for paying for the appraiser. However, this will decrease demand 
for the program. Anyone wishing to donate the development rights of their property 
would have to put in a higher fixed cost than previously with a lower expected value. The 
IRS can consider returning these fixed costs for CEs they approve of in the form of 
additional income tax deduction. This potentially would result in the IRS overpaying for 
some CEs; however, this may reduce the loss in demand for the program. 
Another solution would be for the IRS to still offer an income tax deduction to the 
CEs with a negative present value, however, they would only offer a maximum income 
tax deduction of the value of ecological benefits. The hope here is that, while property 
owners could theoretically get a higher payoff from development, they may not be 
willing to put in the effort to develop the property and may settle for a lower immediate 
payoff. However, if this is the strategy that the IRS would want to use, then we have to 
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ask why we would continue to consider the appraisal at all. This may also decrease 
demand for the program in more expensive locations. 
While the costs of gathering the ecological data can be moved to another source, 
there are potential costs associated with this policy suggestion that make it almost 
impossible. While the break-even rule is theoretically straightforward, gathering the data 
to implement it will never be. This will lead to a lawsuit almost every time a CE is 
deemed ineligible for an income tax deduction. Though the break-even policy would 
offer the optimal results, the costs are unrealistically high. The rule is too flexible and 
offers the potential for litigation. 
Policy “Shortcuts” 
Ultimately the break-even policy is too expensive to implement, so we can look to 
the data for shortcut policies. Congress can mandate that the IRS runs this cost benefit 
analysis once every decade to identify major trends around the CEs that at least break-
even. The overall policy around CEs can stay the same, with the only difference being 
common features in the CEs with a positive present value become mandatory.  
The goal with these policy shortcuts is to utilize the cost analysis method without 
introducing its costs on a larger scale. Although these shortcut policies will not guarantee 
that every individual CE will break-even, they increase society’s return on investment in 
CEs on a macro-level.  
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The Data Set and The Methodology 
Methodology 
The Trust for Public Land Report 
In order to determine if a CE breaks even, I need the loss of income tax dollars 
and a practical estimation of the ecological values protected by the CE. I will elaborate 
more on the income tax dollars further in the “CE Appraisal Values” section, however, 
there is existing literature with methods for valuing ecological features of land. 
Economist Jessica Sargent-Michaud17 worked with The Trust for Public Land to 
estimate the value of conserved land in Colorado, with the goal of determining how many 
dollars in ecological value did the state of Colorado get per lost income tax dollar. She 
used a valuation of per acre values of forest, agricultural area, wetlands, and bodies of 
water to estimate how much the state of Colorado was benefiting from preserving CEs. 
She does this by pulling data from previous studies which value ecological 
features by acre and calculating the value that the state receives. Sargent-Michaud uses 
numbers provided by The Nature Conservancy, who estimated the amount of protected 
land present and separated them into specific ecosystem types. After comparing the value 
generated per year by the conservation of the property and the lost tax dollars given to 
‘purchase’ the conservation, Sargent-Michaud came to the conclusion that the 
Conservation Easement program, in Colorado, has had a return of 6:1 for every 2008 
USD invested. 
 
17 Jessica Sargent-Michaud, A Return on Investment: The Economic Value of Colorado’s Conservation 
Easements 
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However, when looking closely at the specifics, a few issues arise. They got the 
value of each acre of environment from several different sources, most published 
multiple years apart and upwards of 8 years previous this study. During this time the 
value of these ecosystems could have changed drastically resulting in an inaccurate 
estimation of  return to investment. Another issue is that the CE program is a federally 
run program, so looking at CEs on the state level underestimates the cost paid to obtain 
the CE. For example, it is possible for a CE to be present in Colorado, but for the person 
donating the CE to claim benefits in another state. Colorado does benefit from the CE and 
does not have to award any state level incentives to obtain it. 
Sargent-Michaud also does not include any information on the upkeep costs of 
this program. The labor and infrastructure needed, although most likely dwarfed by the 
value of the easements, should not be excluded from the cost of the program. With that 
being said this is a great introductory study on conservation easements that offers a 
specific value for return on investment and gives a good estimate for how profitable this 
program is on a national level. 
Sargent-Michaud’s project focused on if CEs break even on the state level, 
meaning did the state of Colorado award less income tax breaks than it received in value 
of preserved land. Her method for determining a monetary estimate of ecological values 
is valuable for this project, however, her goal is slightly different than mine. Unlike 
Sargent-Michaud, I have access to individual appraisal values and individual descriptions 
of CEs. 
This paper will focus on the individual costs and payoffs of CEs. The costs in this 
case being the loss of federal income tax dollars and not state benefits, such as in the case 
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of Sargent-Michaud’s paper. CEs are a federally run program and as such they either 
need to be looked at from the macro-level or on an individual level. If you look at the 
cost and benefits for CEs on a state level, you risk drastically underestimating the costs of 
the CE because you ignore where most of the payment comes from. 
Unlike Sargent-Michaud, I have the ability to compare the costs and benefits of 
CE’s on an individual level because I have appraisal values for each of the CEs in my 
sample. However, her method has a tremendous amount of value as it allows me to 
estimate the ecological values per year by using her method. I hope to improve on 
estimating the cost of CEs to determine if the Unites States as a whole benefits and not 
any one specific state. 
The Variables 
 In order to determine the ecological value of the property, I needed to determine 
the makeup of the property. The following factors were all considered: the size of forest 
on the property, the type of forest on the property, the size of wetland on the property, the 
size of a body of water on the property, and the size of any agricultural area on the 
property. Using the numbers from Sargent-Michaud’s paper18, I then estimated the value 
of the property in perpetuity and compared that to the amount of income tax dollars lost.  
The Documents Analyzed 
This dataset was created from 61 syndicated CEs that we randomly selected from 
The Atlantic Coast Conservancy. In order to get these variables, I analyzed the CE’s 
Borderline Documentation Report (BDR), its appraisal, and its final CE contract. 
Significantly, this dataset contains appraisal information. While the CEs themselves are a 
 
18 Sargent-Michaud’s numbers are in the appendix, recalculated in 2020 USD. 
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matter of public record, research has been stalled in this area because there has been a 
lack of financial information to analyze. Each of these three documents gave specific 
information about each CE, which will be laid out in summary statistics tables as they are 
discussed. 
Borderline Documentation Report and Conservation Values 
 Every CE in this dataset has a BDR which outlines the ecological values at the 
point that the property falls under CE protection. The BDR is where all of the 
conservation benefits are listed, as a sort of one stop shop for reasons the CE is a valid 
easement. It serves as a centralized location to get basic information about each CE. 
Outlined in the BDR, among other characteristics of the property, are the 
following: its size; location; ecological values; historic significance; any presence of 
threatened/endangered species on the property; and whether it follows a state 
conservation plan. The BDR only has qualitative descriptions of these features, in the 
methodology section I will elaborate on how I estimated a numeric valuation. 
The Restrictions of the CE 
Outlined in both the BDR and the CE’s contract are restrictions placed on the 
property; agricultural areas; resource protection areas; homesites; and other acceptable 
development areas. The contract also states any rights that the property owner retains, 
such as the ability to maintain the property or put up a footpath. 
Commonly, carbon credits and alternative energy are discussed in the CE’s 
contract. Concerning carbon credits, the typically CEs states that “Grantor shall retain all 
rights, benefits, privileges and credits related to carbon sequestration in the above ground 
carbon sequestration” and the CE requires that any carbon sequestration occurs in the 
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agricultural area. Carbon Sequestration is the name for the effect of plants and other 
wildlife to take carbon dioxide out of the air and incorporate it back into the soil. A study 
done on the forests of Sweden showed that carbon sequestration corresponded to 0.5% of 
the regions GDP and was 40% of the value of the forest as a whole. 
Concerning alternative energy, the CE typically states that alternative energy 
sources can be placed on the property’s agricultural area with prior written notice. The 
power generated is expected to be primarily used for the property. 
The CE’s contract mainly offers details on the restrictions offered in the property, 
so this document did not offer many variables to the project. However, carbon credits and 
alternative energy indicate other ecological values that the CE can generate. 
CE Appraisal Values 
Finally, there is the appraisal which states the CE’s previous best use before 
restrictions, its before value, after value, and the value of any enhancement. The value of 
the property before the CE is placed is called the before value and it is based off of the 
property’s previous best use. What an appraiser would have to show is that a property can 
realistically be developed in a certain way to increase its value and that increase in value 
would be the value of the development rights. Then there is the after value, which is the 
value of the property without those development rights. 
The value of the CE is the before value minus the after value, also subtracting any 
enhancement value the property has. The enhancement value is the value gained by any 
contiguous properties that are owned by the owner of the property or the owner’s family. 
When a CE is placed, surrounding properties benefit. As a result, any enhancement 
lessens the value of the CE as a donation. 
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Here is an example of what an appraisal would look like, with fake numbers in 
order to protect the confidentiality of any individual CE’s appraisal. The before value less 
the after value is the value of the CE. Subtract any additional enhancement that would be 
received from a family member owning a property adjacent to the CE, and that is the 
amount of income that can be deducted.  
 
Different Types of Property Restrictions from the CE 
 When preserving a property there need to be different types of restrictions based 
on the different features and uses on the property. CEs address this by creating different 
areas with different restrictions. For this specific sample of CEs there are 4 main types of 
areas: resource protection areas, agricultural areas, acceptable development areas, and 
open areas. 
Each area has specific restrictions that vary by property, but generally the areas 
which offer the most protection are resource protection areas and open areas. Resource 
Figure 1 Example of Language Used in an Appraisal 
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protection areas typically protect some ecological feature of the land, such as a body of 
water, a wetland, a forest, or a specific minable resource. Open areas are typically defined 
last, as they comprise of the remainder of the property after all the other area types are 
defined. Open areas give limited development rights to the property owner, with 
examples including carbon sequestration, the ability to remove dead tree limbs, the ability 
to construct fences, and the ability to maintain a foot path. 
Acceptable development areas and agricultural areas allow for the property owner 
to change or remove certain ecological features. The agricultural area allows for forest 
management, pesticides, livestock, and farming operations. In this dataset, examples of 
agricultural use vary from a pecan orchard to sod farming. An important note is that 
agricultural areas allow for property owners to remove natural features from the property 
such as forests, so agricultural areas offer limited ecological protections. 
In the acceptable development areas property owners are allowed to develop the 
property, with common examples including roads, homesites, and powerlines. These 
areas allow people to still live on the property, however, they offer almost no ecological 
protection. The property owner retains the right to “create, maintain, improve, repair, 
remove, enlarge, or replace19”the structures allowed in these areas. This may sound 
generous, but permission needs to be granted for construction and maintenance in every 
situation, so these rights are limited by the land trust.  
Estimation of Areas 
 The restriction area types on a CE are significant because those areas determine if 
any ecological features are being protected. The BDR describes what conservation values 
 
19 Text taken from a specific CE in this sample. Often the language used when writing a CE is repeated in 
multiple CEs. 
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are present on the property, however, there are limited quantitative data as to how much 
of the property that feature takes up. What the BDR does have are maps showing the 
location of each type of area on the property. 
For example, a BDR may list that a property has hardwood forests but will not 
provide the number of acres that this forest covers. Taking the maps in the BDR, I 
overlaid a grid pattern over each of these maps and used that to estimate the percentage of 
the property taken up by each ecological feature. I then took this percentage, multiplied it 
by the size of the property in acres, and that resulted in an estimation of the ecological 
features the property contained, in acres. 
Assumptions 
 In calculating the ecological value of the property there were some assumptions 
that needed to be made with the data to ensure only the ecological values in protected 
areas are counted. If the property owner has the right to modify or remove an element 
from the property, then that element was not counted as if it has been conserved. 
Likewise, if a pre-existing property restriction was expanded, then only the annexed area 
of the restriction was counted and not the original restriction. 
Forests 
 The most impactful assumption made is that the value of forests was only 
considered if the forest was located in an area that specifically prohibited the removal of 
trees. The goal of this project is to measure the value of the protected ecological features, 
so I must only consider the restrictions placed on the property in my calculations. Though 
a forest or other valuable ecological feature may be present on the property at the time the 
CE was placed, if that feature is placed in an agricultural area or in an acceptable 
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development area, then it is not protected. Because of this, there is a distinction in my 
calculations between what features are present at the inception of the CE and what 
features are actually protected. 
Though 57 CEs claimed to have forests on the property, only 33 placed those 
forests under a resource protection area or under an open area. The other 24 CEs placed 
agricultural areas over the forests. Since the agricultural area is not protecting those 
forests, that land is valued as farmland and a fixed value in my calculations. Similarly, I 
place no value on acceptable development areas because they provide no conservation 
value, regardless of what features may be present at the time the CE is placed. 
Rivers and Riparian Buffers 
 The second assumption I have made is on how to count rivers and riparian 
buffers. Many of the CEs placed on properties with rivers expanded upon preexisting 
riparian buffer protection requirements. Concerning the states in this data sample, 
Georgia requires a 25 ft buffer from the center of the river toward each bank; Alabama, 
Florida, and Tennessee require a 35 ft buffer; and West Virginia requires a 50 ft buffer20. 
Since these requirements would have existed regardless of if a CE was placed on the 
property, only the previously unprotected areas around the river were counted when 
valuing the ecological conservation values. 
Conservation Values with No Clear Monetary Valuation 
Additionally, when determining the ecological value there were a number of 
factors ignored when making these estimations. These were simply characteristics to 
 
20 State requirements were mentioned in the BDR of each CE, so these numbers come from The Atlantic 
Coast Conservancy. 
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which I could not assign a dollar amount21. Location, the presence of threatened or 
endangered species, the presence of historically significant landmarks, songbird 
migration routes, and scenic views were all ignored; however, these are all things that 
BDRs tout as conservation values. Table 1 shows how many CEs claimed to conserve a 
threatened or endangered species, a historically significant landmark, a mineable 
mineral22, and if the CE falls on a songbird migratory route.  
Table 1 Conservation Values with No Clear Monetary Valuation 
Type of Value Claimed Number of CEs 
Threatened Species 5 
Federally Endangered Species 1 
Historic Value 4 
Mineable Minerals 13 
Songbird Migratory Route 23 
Table Conservation Values with No Clear Monetary Valuation shows the number of 
CEs with conservation values which are difficult to assign a monetary value. 
 
Ponds and Littoral Buffers 
 Similar to the assumption made concerning rivers, ponds also have some 
preexisting protections separate from the CE. However, because ponds are an uneven 
shape, I counted the whole pond when calculating the conserved ecological values. This 
affects 23 of the properties in this sample and is something that can be considered an 
overestimation of conservation values. 
 For 21 of the 23 properties with a pond, the simplification method used above 
resulted in an average maximum possible price overestimation of 3.83%, with 2 of the 
CEs being outliers having a 16.20% and 19.91% maximum possible price overestimation. 
This means that on average, the maximum overestimation of the CE’s conservation value 
 
21 This is not a unique problem to this project, as some things that provide great ecological value are not 
included in the IRS criteria; for example, there is not anything explicit that gives benefits for CEs that 
protect drinking water. CEs that protect drinking water have to justify themselves through 1 of the other 
IRS criteria, such as providing scenic views or following a preexisting conservation plan. 
22 The presence of a mineable resource is difficult to value because its value does not come from its 
presence on the property but from preventing the negative externalities associated with extracting it. 
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was 3.83%, or the maximum value that the pond contributed to the CE’s conservation 
value. 
Overlap 
 Another problem that occurred is the presence of overlap between bodies of water 
and wetlands on the property. This affected 31 of the properties in the sample and on 
those properties, the overlap was counted and then divided evenly between the features in 
question. 
Income Tax Deduction 
 The final assumption I made was to standardize the loss in cash flow to the US 
Government. When calculating the maximum loss in tax dollars, I assumed a tax 
deduction value of 25%; meaning, the entirety of the appraisal value was deducted from 
income taxed, but only 25% would have been paid as tax dollars. Each dollar amount in 
this project was calculated in 2020 dollars. I am also ignoring the possibility of there 
being additional benefits coming from any state program. 
Additionally, I assumed that all of the possible deductible value was claimed in 
the first year. This assumption is reasonable because every CE in this sample is a 
syndication, so there are multiple individuals who can claim the income tax deduction in 
the first year. This assumption lets me ignore the difference in value of the tax deduction 
in future years. 
Example of the Break-Even Analysis 
 So far, the methodology has only been discussed in abstract terms, so it is 
necessary to give an example to clarify what this project aims to achieve. 
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Here is an example of this method on one imaginary property with made up 
appraisal numbers. The appraised value of the CE is the amount that can be deducted 
from tax income; however, it is not the amount of tax dollars lost. The reduction of the 
cash flow of income tax dollars is the amount deducted from income multiplied by the 
tax bracket that the taxpayer falls into. If we assume a CE value of $850,000.00 then the 
loss of income tax dollars would be 25% of that, or $212,500.00. 
For the ecological values, let us assume the property in this example is 100 acres 
and the property has the following features: 50 acres of mixed forest, 30 acres of 
farmland, 15 acres of wetland, 4 acres of flowing water, and a 1-acre homesite. The 
homesite is in an acceptable development area and thus has no conservation value. The 
30 acres of farmland is in an agricultural area and thus only has conservation value as 
farmland regardless of what features are on that part of the property. Agricultural area is 
valued at $340.01 per acre, so the total value is $10,200.30. 
For the sake of this example, all of the other ecological features mentioned are in 
a resource protection area. The 50 acres of mixed forest are valued at $1,057.24 each, or 
$52,862.00 total; and the 15 acres of wetland are valued at  $941.94 each, or $14,129.10. 
These values are simple to calculate; however, the value of the flowing water requires an 
extra step. 
Let us assume that this property is in Georgia, where there is already a required 
minimum riparian buffer of 25 ft from either side of the center of the river. We will also 
assume that this CE, like the majority in the sample, increased the riparian buffer to 100 
ft from the center of the river. This means that only ¾ of the protection offered to the 
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river are new protections and that ¼ of the protection is not a part of the CE’s value. So, 
calculating the area of river newly protected by the CE looks like this: 
200 ft – 50 ft *  5 acres = 3.75 acres 200 ft 
 
 The 3.75 acres of the new riparian buffer is valued at $320.79 acres each, for a 
total of $1202.96. We can total all of the ecological value that the property contains for a 
total present value of $78,394.36 per year, as shown in Table 2. And finally, we can then 
take that per year value and divide it by the real interest rate, 3%, to get the property’s 
perpetuity value, or $2,613,145.33. 
Table 2 Sample Property Break-Even Calculations 
Feature of Property Value Per Year 
50 acres of Mixed Forest $ 52,862.00 
30 acres of Farmland $ 10,200.30 
15 acres of Wetland $ 14,129.10 
5 acres of Flowing Water $ 1,202.96 
1 acre Homesite $ 0.00 
Total $ 78,394.36 
 
Now that we have the income tax dollars lost and the perpetuity value of the 
property, the final step is to compare if the investment made on the CE broke even. The 
per acre ecological value is $26,131.45 and the per acre loss in income tax dollars is 
$2,125.00. It is obvious that this CE does pay for itself. Mathematically, $1.00 of lost 
income tax dollars buys $12.30 of protected ecological value. 
 $26,131.45 = 12.30 The CE’s benefits are greater than its costs CE “breaks even” $2,125.00 
 
This property is a great investment for society and we want to increase the amount 
approved of CEs like this one, so we get a better overall break-even rate. We would need 
to repeat this process for other CEs and see what features the CEs with a positive present 
value share. For example, say we repeated this process on 50 other CEs and, typically, 
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the CEs that at least broke-even had more preserved forest than the CEs that did not 
break-even; then, we may consider implementing a policy that requires a certain  
percentage of the property to be preserved forest. The value of this project is in proposing 
this model and  I am running the model in this paper to show what  the potential results 
can be. 
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Results 
Now that we have walked through the method, the variables collected, the 
assumptions made, and a tangible example we can move on to analyzing the results on 
the 61 CEs in this sample. 
Summary Statistics 
State and Year 
 
Table 4 CEs by Year  
Year Total Number of CEs 
2010 2 
2011 4 
2012 7 
2013 14 
2014 8 
2015 7 
2016 17 
2017 1 
Total 61 
Table CEs by Year shows the different years the CEs 
were from, with the majority of CEs from the sample 
being from 2013 and 2016. 
 
 To give some context, the CEs in this sample are located in five states, as shown 
in Table 3, and were finalized in 2010 – 2017, as shown in Table 4. They also are not 
concentrated in any specific part of the state; to use Georgia as an example, its 41 CEs are 
spread out across 28 different counties. Also, all of Georgia’s CEs support a state 
conservation plan. 
Table 3 Location of CEs by State 
State Number of CEs Different Counties 
with CE 
Number of CEs that 
Support a State Plan 
Georgia 41 28 41 
Alabama 10 7 9 
Florida 6 2 6 
Tennessee 3 4 3 
West Virginia 1 1 1 
Total 61 42* 60 
Table Locations of CEs by State shows the locations of CEs by state, how many different counties per 
state, and the number of CEs per state that support a state plan. There are 3 CEs that are located 
simultaneously in 2 counties, one CE in Tennessee and two in Georgia. 
 40 
Whether or not a CE follows preexisting government conservation plans is an 
important factor in determining the societal value of that CE. In order for a CE to be 
eligible for an income tax deduction the IRS requires that the property have some kind of 
scenic view or that the CE aligns with a “clearly defined federal, state, or local  
governmental conservation policy.” The majority of these CEs support a state 
conservation plan, with the most common being Georgia’s Comprehensive Wildlife 
Strategy, with all 41 CEs in Georgia supporting it. 
Georgia’s Comprehensive Wildlife Strategy says its goal is “to conserve 
Georgia’s animals, plants, and natural habitats” and that it aims to achieve that partially 
through public agencies and private conservation organizations23. Specifically, the plan 
includes a goal of increasing funds available to CEs as one of its highest priority 
conservation actions24. 
According the plan, CEs are protecting more land than state owned land. Between 
the 2005 and the 2015 versions of the Georgia Comprehensive Wildlife Strategy, Georgia 
had acquired “more than 105,000 acres of high-priority lands for wildlife conservation 
and public recreation” with “conservation partners and easements protect[ing] another 
290,000-plus acres23,” 
CEs play a key role in achieving Georgia’s conservation goals. A particular 
example of the state contributions of CEs are the caves of Southwest Georgia. The caves 
in the Pelham Escarpment area of Southwest Georgia provide habitat for rare species 
such as “the southeastern bat, Georgia blind salamander, and Dougherty Plain cave 
 
23 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, pg. x 
24 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, pg. 224 
 41 
crayfish25 .” CEs were protecting these caves while no caves from this region were under 
the protection of state-owned land.  
CE Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, pg. 129 
Table 5 CE Sizes  Table 6 CE Size Statistics 
Size Range (acres) Number of CEs Mean 296.23 acres 
0-100 24 Median 138.23 acres 
101-200 14 Minimum 21.89 acres 
201-400 10 Maximum 2629.70 acres 
401-600 4 σ 424.28 acres 
601-800 5  
801+ 4 
Total 61 
Table CE Sizes sorts the CEs by property size, in acres. Table CE Size Statistics gives 
the mean, median, minimum, and maximum CE size in the sample. Graph CE Sizes is 
a visual representation of the individual data points analyzed in these two tables. 
 
Figure 2 CE Size Graph 
This Graph shows the size of all the properties in this sample, sorted from smallest to largest. The average 
property size is 296.23 acres. 
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         In this sample, the average size of a property is 296.23 acres with a standard 
deviation of 424.28 acres, as shown in Table 6. The smallest property in the sample is 
21.89 acres and the largest is 2629.70 acres. 39.34% of the sample is under 100 acres, 
22.95% of the sample is between 101-200 acres, and 37.70% of the sample is above 201 
acres. 
Scenic Views 
Table 7 Scenic Views 
Type of View Claimed Number of CEs 
Any Type of Scenic View 34 
Highway 15 
Local Street 21 
River 7 
City 3 
None 27 
Total 61 
Table Scenic Views shows the total scenic views claimed 
on the Baseline Documentation Report of a CE. 34 CEs 
claimed any type of scenic view, however, there are 12 
CEs which claim more than 1 type of scenic view. This 
results in the highway, local street, river, and city scenic 
views not totaling the 34 CEs which claimed scenic views 
but totaling 12 more than that number (46). 
 
The IRS guidelines also consider if a CE has scenic views that are available to the 
public. Over half of the CEs in this sample claimed some kind of scenic view on the 
property and 12 of the properties claimed multiple scenic views. The BDR lists the type 
of scenic views; the specific street is listed, if there are scenic views from a navigable 
rive on the property, or, more generally, if a city can enjoy the property. 
Table 8 shows the scenic views claimed, sorted by linear distance claimed. For 
the properties which included a linear distance of the scenic views claimed, there was an 
average of almost 6,000 ft for every scenic view to a highway claimed, almost 4,700 ft 
for scenic views to a river, and just over 4,000 ft claimed for every local street.  
Scenic views are listed explicitly as a conservation purpose that legitimizes a CE 
to the IRS, however, there is no minimum standard for what constitutes a legitimate  
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scenic view. Most CEs in this sample gave a linear distance, however, 3 scenic 
views were claimed with no mention of length. And while it is logical for a single 
property to offer scenic views to a highway, local street, or a navigable waterway I am 
not convinced that a single property can offer scenic views to an entire city. Of the 3 CEs 
in this sample that claimed city scenic views, 2 gave linear distances but 1 claimed scenic 
views to a city with absolutely no justification. 
In order for scenic views to be conserved by tax dollars, there needs to be some 
standard as to what is being protected. Unfortunately, I was unable to find any persuasive 
literature valuing scenic views, so the method used in this project will not help. However, 
other standards are possible to implement, and income tax deductions should not be 
awarded without a metric to determine the benefit of the scenic views claimed. 
Table 8 Scenic Views by Distance 
Distance Highway Local Street River City 
Under 1,000 ft 0 0 1 0 
1,000 ft to 2,500 ft 4 10 1 1 
2,501 ft to 5,000 ft 2 7 3 1 
5,001 ft to 7,500 ft 4 2 1 0 
7,501 ft to 10,000 ft 1 1 0 0 
10,000 ft + 3 2 1 0 
Linear distance not given 1 1 0 1 
Mean 5975.43 ft 4072.12 ft 4699.51 ft 2347.50 ft 
Total 15 23* 7 3 
Table Scenic Views by Distance sorts the number of scenic views by linear distance. 2 CEs claim 2 separate local 
street scenic views, so totals on this chart will not match up to the previous Scenic Views Table. 
 
Forests and Water 
The BDR lists the type of forest and bodies of water on the property when stating the 
conservation benefits. Many properties with bodies of water have a mixture of water 
types and only 3 properties in this sample lack bodies of water. 
 The majority of CEs with a body of water increase protections of riparian or 
littoral buffers around them. Riparian buffers protect the stretches of land around a 
flowing body of water and littoral buffers protect the land around a still body of water. 
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These buffers are important because they prevent farms and livestock from damaging 
rivers. These buffers not only protect the current property’s quality of water, but other 
water sources that this river may flow to. 
Table 9 Forest Type 
Forest Category Number of CEs 
Oak-Hickory-Pine 31 
Planted Pine/Planted Loblolly Pine 14 
Hardwood Forest 6 
Mixed Mesophytic Forest 5 
Swamp/Wetland Forest 4 
Coastal Forest (Maritime) 3 
Planted Pecan Grove 1 
Total Forests Claimed 64* 
No Forest Claimed 4 
Table Forest Type shows the type of forests contained on the 
property. 5 of the CEs are identified as having more than one type of 
forest. As a result, the total forest types claimed do not equal the 
number of CEs (n=61). 
 
Table 10 Water Ecological Values 
Still Water 
Still Water Type Number of CEs 
Ponds and Lakes 20 
Wetlands 21 
Flowing Water 
Flowing Water Type Number of CEs 
Stream 13 
River 12 
Creek 37 
No Water 3 
Table Water Ecological Values shows the types 
of still and flowing water claimed on the 
property. Many CEs have more than one type of 
water on the property, so the total water values 
claimed will not equal the total number of CEs in 
this sample (n=61). 
 
As for the forests, 57 of the properties in this sample have some kind of forest and 
5 claim more than one type of forest. Mixed oak-hickory-pine forest were the most 
common forest type claimed. Other common forest types in the sample include pine 
forests, wetland forests, and hardwood forests. Less common types include maritime 
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forests and mixed mesophytic forests. Maritime Forests26 are coastal estuaries that grow 
along coastal barrier islands. The US National Ocean Service describes estuaries27 as 
bodies of water usually found where rivers meet the sea and as some of the most 
productive ecosystems in the world. A mixed mesophytic forest, as defined by the World 
Wildlife Fund, is a critically endangered habitat in the southern half of North America28. 
They are the remainder of the ancient mesic forests. Over 95% of this habitat has been 
lost over the last 200 years. 
Of the 61 CEs in this sample, 64 forests are claimed. However, as mentioned in 
the assumptions section, just because a forest is claimed does not mean that the CE 
necessarily prohibits removal of trees. If the forest is in an agricultural area or in an 
acceptable development area, then the trees can be removed. Ecological features of the 
property are protected if they fall into a specific resource protection area or in the 
property’s open area. However, 24 properties have forests which land in an agricultural 
area, meaning the forests can be removed for agricultural purposes. 
The IRS does allow for CEs to protect farmland if it “yields a significant public 
benefit,” meaning that the farmland provides some kind of scenic view or that it falls 
inline with some local or federal conservation plan. The Georgia Comprehensive Wildlife 
Strategy does mention helping farmers; however, it mentions wanting to provide more 
technical assistance so that farmers so not damage rivers29. and can restore woodlands30. 
While farmland is important, it is obvious that conserving farmland is not the 
highest priority of CEs in the state of Georgia, but rather the state aims to prevent farmers 
from harming the valuable ecological features of their property. I am suggesting that a 
 
26 US National Ocean Service, What is a maritime forest? 
27 US National Ocean Service, What is an estuary? 
28 Loucks et al., n.d, Appalachian Mixed Mesophytic Forests 
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forest cannot be claimed unless the CE removes agricultural rights from a majority of the 
forest. And water values should also have a minimum buffer increase to be eligible to be 
claimed as an ecological value.  
Homesites 
Table 11 CEs with Homesites 
Homesites # Number of CEs 
0 Homesites 25 CEs 
Existing Only 4 
New Only 14 
1 Homesite 18 CEs 
Existing Only 0 
Mixed 3 
New Only 18 
2 Homesites 11 CEs 
Existing Only 0 
Mixed 3 
New Only 18 
3 Homesites 5 CEs 
Existing Only 0 
Mixed 1 
New Only 4 
4+ Homesites 2 CEs 
Existing Only 0 
Mixed 1 
New Only 1 
Total 61 CEs 
Table CEs with Homesites sorts the number of CEs 
by the number of homesites on each of the properties. 
Underneath each homesite, the CEs are sorted by if 
all the homesites were existing, all were new, or if 
there was a mix of existing and new homesites. 
Unlike forests, bodies of water, and scenic views, homesites are not a 
conservation value. However, it is important to have a homesite on the property in order 
to ensure that future property owners will want to buy this parcel of land. The typical 
homesite in this sample is limited to 1 acre with the largest homesite in this sample taking 
up 5 acres, though this was an exception and not the norm. That particular property is 
almost 140 acres, so 3.62% of the property is dedicated to this homesite. 
 
29 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, pg. 93 
30 Georgia Department of Natural Resources, pg. 71 
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40.98% of CEs allow for no new homesites and had no homesites to start with. 
CEs usually allow repair or replacement of existing homes and agricultural buildings. 9 
CEs in this sample have at least 1 existing building on the property. Alternatively, CEs 
sometimes allow the “carving out” of new home sites. 42 of the CEs in this sample allow 
for at least 1 new homesite. 
Homesites are always in acceptable development area, meaning that property 
owners retain the right to “create, maintain, improve, repair, remove, enlarge, or replace” 
the homesites within the borders of the acceptable development area, however, prior 
written notice is required. If a reserved homesite is being built, the specific location will 
be determined 60 days before construction and the location can only be in a few specific 
locations on the property. For most of the sample, the homesite can be built in 
agricultural area, but not in any resource protection areas. 
 70.49% of the sample only allows for 0-1 homesites, but there are some outliers. 
The most extreme outlier in this sample allows for the construction of 7 new homesites 
on a property with no preexisting buildings; this particular property is almost 450 acres 
and the homesites are allowed a maximum total of 6.5 acres, so this is a total of about 
1.50% of the property being dedicated to these homesites.  
Larger CEs have more room to allow for homeowners to construct large homes 
without compromising overall conservation efforts. A homesite that takes up 1 acre in a 
forest seems less harmful than turning that forest into agricultural area and giving the 
property owner the ability to cut that forest down. Though homesites are a typical focus 
in the conversation around CEs this particular sample does not point to any outrageous 
abuses concerning homesites. 
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CEs that Break Even 
Now that we have finished viewing the summary statistics, we can now look at 
whether or not the CEs break even, or in other words if they have a positive present 
value. Figure 2 shows the CEs that broke even and shows their previous best use.  
              Of the 61 CEs in the sample, 36.07% of the CEs at least break even, while 
63.93% do not. These 22 CEs shared key characteristics with one another, such as the 
amount of income tax dollars awarded per acre, the property size, the inclusion of a 
homesite, and the previous best use of the property. 
Aspects this Method Does Not Consider and Potential Errors 
Though the method used itself has very few issues, the estimated size of the 
ecological features was calculated by hand using a grid system, so some error can be 
 
Graph Income Tax Break Compared to Ecological Value shows the size of all of the properties in the 
sample, sorted from smallest to largest. The average size of a property in this sample is 291.35 acres. 
 
Figure 3 CEs that Break Even 
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expected. Table 12 shows the change in the number of CEs with a positive present value 
if the ecological benefits were inaccurately estimated. Since the appraisal value is known, 
the estimated value of the ecological benefits is the only potential source of error in this 
calculation.  
Some concerns over these estimations are that sources are used that are from as 
early as 1997. Though these numbers have been updated for inflation, it is likely that the 
values themselves have changed since the study originally occurred. If a policy like this 
were to be implemented, these numbers would need to be updated. The error estimation 
table shows how different numbers would affect the outcome of this project.  
Additionally, as mentioned in the “Assumptions” section, there are many 
variables that I would have considered if I could place an estimation of monetary value 
onto them. There are social considerations that have a subjective value, such as historic 
landmarks, and then there are other ecological benefits that I could not put a value on, 
such as cave systems and the presence of threatened species. 
 A source of value that I do not consider are scenic views, which 34 of the CEs 
claim as a benefit. Scenic views are a positive externality of the CE. They are also 
difficult to privatize because they are non-expendable and, almost, non-excludable. It is 
not profitable to leave a property green and undeveloped but putting up a parking garage 
is. Though I would argue that scenic views are not the most valuable aspects of these CEs 
and we should not overpay for them, they do have a value that I am not considering. 
Scenic views are exactly the kind of thing that a government program should attempt to 
protect and if there were a way to value them, I would consider them in my calculations. 
 In addition to not considering positive externalities of the CE, I do not consider 
the prevention of negative externalities. By preventing development, pollution is 
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prevented. This becomes the opposite of the tragedy of the commons, where the benefit 
from preventing the overutilization of a shared resource is impossible to calculate. This 
potentially explains why no property that listed mining as its previous best use broke 
even. 
 It is likely that these aspects resulted in an underestimation of the ecological 
values mentioned. Table 12 shows what the difference would be if the ecological values 
are underestimated by 25%, 50%, or 100%. 
Table 12 Error Estimations Symmetry Test 
Error Level 
CEs with a 
Positive 
Present Value  
CEs with a 
Negative 
Present Value 
At current estimation 22 39 
If Ecological Values were overestimated by 25% 19 42 
If Ecological Values were overestimated by 50% 16 45 
If Ecological Values were underestimated by 25% 25 36 
If Ecological Values were underestimated by 50% 29 32 
If Ecological Values were underestimated by 100% 34 27 
Table Error Estimations shows the how many CEs would have broken even if the conservation 
values were overestimated by 25% or 50% as well as if they were underestimated by 25%, by 
50%, or by 100%. 
 
Cost and Benefits 
Table 13 Average Cost and Benefits Per Acre 
 
Average Income Tax 
Dollars Awarded Per 
Acre 
Average Ecological 
Value in Dollars Per 
Acre 
Whole Sample $ 36,682.00 $ 18,928.71 
Standard Deviation $ 35,432.82 $ 9,602.03 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  $ 5,377.83 $ 16,353.78 
Standard Deviation $ 4,786.18 $ 6,490.07 
Only CEs with a Negative Present Value $ 54,340.77 $ 20,381.24 
Standard Deviation $ 32,898.42 $ 10,784.06 
Table Average Cost and Benefits Per Acre shows the average amount of income tax dollars per acre and the 
average ecological value in dollars per acre. Both calculations are in 2020 dollars. 
 
One shortcut policy to consider is placing a maximum income tax deduction per 
acre. The CEs with a positive present value awarded less income tax dollars per acre than 
the sample. Table 13 shows the average income tax dollars awarded per acre and the 
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sample average is $36,682.00 per acre. When sorting the sample by the CE’s present 
value, the difference is staggering with the positive CEs awarding almost 7 times less tax 
dollars per acre than the sample average and more than 10 times less than the negative 
CEs. 
What is even more interesting is the average ecological value per acre. The whole 
sample has an average ecological value of $18,928.71 per acre, but the positive CEs 
actually have a lower ecological value per acre of $16,353.78. The negative CEs have a 
higher average than the sample, with $20,381.24 per acre. For the whole sample, on 
average, $1 in lost income tax gets $0.52 of ecological value per acre. For the positive 
CEs, $1 in lost income tax gets $3.04 in ecological value. And for the negative CEs, $1 in 
lost income tax gets $0.38 in ecological value. This means that the return on investment 
is over 8 times greater for positive CEs than negative. Looking at these averages together 
suggests that the CEs that break-even do so not because they are placed on properties 
with a higher ecological value, but instead because they are cheaper to acquire than other 
CEs. 
19 CEs fall under $10,000 in lost income tax per acre and all of those 19 CEs 
have a positive present value. If those 19 were the only CEs approved, then every $1 of 
lost income tax dollars would result in $4.27 of ecological value per acre. If that limit 
were increased to $15,000, that amount would go down to $3.06 in ecological value per 
acre for every $1 in lost income tax dollars. Most of the CEs in the sample with a positive 
present value fall under $13,000 in lost income tax dollars per acre. 
If a shortcut policy were to be implemented concerning lost income tax dollars 
per acre, then location needs to be considered. The donated development rights will have 
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a different value depending on where the property is located. In this sample a cap of 
$10,000 in lost income tax per acre makes sense, however, it would likely not make sense 
for every CE across the nation. Perhaps this cap can be calculated based on the average 
property value in different locations. That way, demand for the program will not be too 
high in areas with low property values and non-existent in areas with high property 
values. 
CE Size 
Another shortcut policy consideration is whether or not a minimum size 
requirement should be implemented for the properties the CEs are placed on. The CEs 
which broke even tend to be larger than the other CEs. Table 14 shows the difference in 
means of the sizes of the properties with CEs that broke even and the properties which 
Graph CE Size shows the individual size of the properties in acres. The smallest property is 21.89 acres and 
the largest is 2629.70 acres. The green lines are the 22 CEs which broke even. The smallest CE that broke 
even was 79.55 acres and the average size of the CEs that broke even were 574.21 acres. 
 
Figure 4 The Sizes of CEs that at Least Broke Even Graph 
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did not break even. On average, the CEs that broke even were placed on larger properties, 
which suggests larger parcels of land benefit from increased returns to scale to the land’s 
ecological values. 
For the whole sample, the average size of the property a CE was placed on is 
291.35 acres. The mean for only the CEs that broke even is almost twice that of the 
whole sample and the mean for only the CEs that did not break even is almost half of that 
of the sample. 
Of the 22 properties over 200 acres, 18 of the CEs placed on those properties have 
a positive present value and 4 do not. If a policy was implemented that required a CE to 
be placed on a property 200 acres or over, then $1 of lost income tax dollars would result 
in $1.85 in ecological value. Overall, we would gain value regardless of the 4 CEs in the 
sample that did not break even. 
Table 14 CE Size Statistics Part II 
 Whole Sample CEs with a 
Positive 
Present Value 
CEs with a 
Negative 
Present Value 
Mean 296.23 acres 574.21 acres 139.42 acres 
Median 138.23 acres 433.10 acres 65.17 acres 
Minimum 21.89 acres 79.55 acres 21.89 acres 
Maximum 2629.70 acres 2629.10 acres 1194.00 acres 
Standard Deviation 424.28 acres 553.09 acres 212.62 acres 
Total 61 properties 22 properties 39 properties 
Table CE Size Statistics Expanded compares the mean, median, minimum, and 
maximum between the sizes of the properties with CEs with a positive present 
value and the CEs with a negative present value. 
 
The effectiveness of a CE’s conservation efforts is impacted by the property’s 
size. This suggests that favor should be given to larger properties and there should be a 
minimum size requirement in order for CEs to be eligible for an income tax deduction. If 
a minimum size requirement were added, however, the IRS would automatically reject 
some CEs that would have been good deals. One solution to this could be to add an 
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application process for exceptions to be considered. These could be property owners who 
hire their own surveyors to prove that their CE would break even. We may also consider 
exceptions where the property is small but is contiguous to a national park or other public 
land. These properties may not break even themselves and may not have the minimum 
size requirement, however, they would enhance the value of other protected properties by 
increasing those efforts. 
Homesites 
Setting a maximum per acre tax award and setting a minimum property size are 
clear improvements over the current problem. My next suggestion is not as black and 
white; however, it is a worthy topic of conversation. I believe there should be a 
requirement to place a homesite on a CE. CEs with homesites broke even more often than 
CEs that did not allow for homesites. Looking at Table 15, only 20% of the CEs with no 
homesites broken even while 47.22% of the CEs with at least 1 homesite broke even. 
Table 15 CEs with Homesites Part II 
Homesites # Number of CEs 
0 Homesites 25 CEs 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  5 
CEs with a Negative Present Value 20 
1 Homesite 18 CEs 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  9 
CEs with a Negative Present Value 9 
2 Homesites 11 CEs 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  3 
CEs with a Negative Present Value 8 
3 Homesites 5 CEs 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  3 
CEs with a Negative Present Value 2 
4+ Homesites 2 CEs 
CEs with a Positive Present Value  2 
CEs with a Negative Present Value 0 
Total 61 CEs 
Table CEs with Homesites Part II sorts the number of CEs by the 
number of homesites on each of the properties. Underneath each 
homesite, the CEs are sorted by the number of CEs that broke even. 
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Obviously having a homesite on the property is not an ecological value. However, 
homesites allow for the property to still be lived on and thus to still have someone to take 
care of the property. These restrictions are placed in perpetuity and not placing a 
homesite on the property at the inception of the CE prevents that property from ever 
being inhabitable. It is important to be skeptical when placing homesite in order to ensure 
that the CE just creating luxury mansions, however, we need to be sure to not over 
correct and place no homesites on a property. 
Previous Best Use 
Finally, previous best use also trended between the CEs with a positive present 
value. I am not prepared to make a shortcut policy suggestion because there are 
additional unknown variables, however, these trends should be considered further. It is 
unclear what is the relationship between previous best use and the value of the CE as an 
investment. This is abundantly clear in the case of mining properties. 
Table 16 Source of Appraisal Best Use 
Use Number of CEs CEs with a Positive Present Value  
Residential 23 16 
Mixed Use 14 3 
Mining 13 0 
Commercial 5 1 
Agriculture 3 2 
Other 2 0 
Total 61 22 
Table Source of Appraisal Best Use sorts the sample by what the appraisal claimed was 
the best use of the property, meaning the use that would maximize the value of the 
development rights. Mixed Use means that the Appraisal based its calculations off of a 
mix of both residential and commercial use. 
 
Table 16 shows that there were no CEs that broke even on property which listed 
mining as its previous best use. Perhaps this just means that society needs to overpay if 
we want to prevent the harms from mining. Or, another possibility, is that I have no 
method of valuing the prevention of the negative externalities associating with mining. 
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Additionally, I have no way to value the ecological benefits of cave systems and as a 
result my calculations may have a bias against the ecological values of those properties.  
Also, the most common previous best property uses for the CEs with a positive 
present value was residential development. This could mean that residential properties are 
simply more common and less expensive to obtain. Or it could also mean that the 
ecological benefits on residential properties are more straightforward to calculate. 
Because there are many remaining questions concerning the relationship between 
previous best use and the CE’s present value, more research needs to be done before 
specific policies can be suggested for addressing these trends. 
Before vs After Property Values 
Graph Total Property Values shows the appraised before and after values, sorted by ascending before 
value. The difference between the before and after value is the appraised value of the CE. 
 
Figure 5 Before vs After Value of the Property Graph 
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Because of the trends among the CEs that broke even, I wanted to test if the CEs 
that broke even happened to have a lower opportunity cost than the CEs that did not 
break even. This is significant because it would mean that the CEs that broke even mainly 
broke even because their development rights were worth less. We already know the CEs 
that broke even had a lower income tax dollar award per acre on average, however, we do 
not know where that lower award came from. One possibility is that this came from the 
appraisal and the difference in before and after values. 
The opportunity cost is determined by comparing the before and after value on the 
appraisal. Figure 4 shows the before value and the after value, with the difference 
between the two lines being the value of the CE as a donation or, in other words, the 
opportunity cost of the lost development rights of the property. In this case, the 
opportunity cost is the price to society because the opportunity cost is what the IRS bases 
its income tax deduction on. 
In addition to determining the whole sample’s opportunity cost, because no 
mining properties broke even, I was interested in any difference between the value lost on 
properties who claimed mining as their previous best use and non-mining properties. And 
since residential properties made up the largest percentage of the CEs that broke even, I 
was also interested in difference in value lost on residential and non-residential 
properties. 
In Table 17, I show the sample average as well as the differences in averages 
between the aforementioned groups. The first analysis is the minimum, maximum, and 
mean of the whole sample. Then there are 3 tests which sort the sample into the 
properties with CEs that broke even and those with CEs that did not, mining and non-
mining properties, and then residential vs nonresidential properties. 
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In this sample the properties lost 92.68% of their value on average once the CE 
was placed. For only the properties with CEs that broke even, the mean is smaller than 
the mean of the whole sample, but only by about 2 percentage points. There is no notable 
difference between the percentage of value lost from placing the CE on these properties. 
Table 17 Property Value Lost due to CE 
Entire Sample (n=61) 
Minimum 67.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.84% of Value Lost 
Mean 92.68% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 8.00 percentage points 
 
Positive Present Value (n=22) 
Minimum 67.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.58% of Value Lost 
Mean 90.23% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 7.54 percentage points 
Negative Present Value (n=39) 
Minimum 80.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.84% of Value Lost 
Mean 94.06% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 8.01 percentage points 
 
Mining Properties Only (n=13) 
Minimum 97.02% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.43% of Value Lost 
Mean 98.54% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 0.72 percentage points 
Non-Mining Properties (n=48) 
Minimum 67.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.84% of Value Lost 
Mean 92.95% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 8.26 percentage points 
 
Residential Properties Only (n=23) 
Minimum 67.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.68% of Value Lost 
Mean 92.77% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 7.98 percentage points 
Non-Residential Properties (n=38) 
Minimum 80.00% of Value Lost 
Maximum 99.84% of Value Lost 
Mean 92.63% of Value Lost 
Standard Deviation 8.12 percentage points 
Table Property Value Lost due to CE shows the percent of property 
value lost when the development rights were lost on the property. 
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Similarly, mining properties had an average that was 6 percentage points lower 
than the average for non-mining properties. I initially hypostasized that the properties that 
listed their previous best use as mining were bringing up the average value lost because I 
believed the opportunity cost of having minable minerals on the property exceeded the 
opportunity cost of other previous best uses, however, this does not appear to be the case. 
There is no significant difference found between the percentage of property value lost on 
mining vs non-mining properties. 
As for residential vs nonresidential properties, their means are almost identical. 
Since there are no differences in any of the means in these 3 tests, the CEs that broke 
even did not do so because of a decreased opportunity cost of the property. Rather, the 
development rights lost on the property are comparable, but the before value is 
significantly smaller for properties with CEs that broke even. 
Table 18 Average Appraised Before Value per Acre 
 Mean Before Value per Acre Standard Deviation 
Whole Sample $ 157,720.10 $ 150,100.62 
Only CEs with a Positive Present Value  $ 22,920.56 $ 19,205.92 
Only CEs with a Negative Present Value $ 233,760.87 $ 137,534.66 
Table Average Appraised Before shows the average appraised before value per acre and the standard 
deviation for the whole sample, only the CEs with a positive present value, and only the CEs with a negative 
present value. All calculations are in 2020 dollars. 
 
 Table 18 shows that the sample average before value is $157,720.10 per acre. For 
the CEs that broke even, that average is around $130,000 smaller per acre at $22,920.56 
per acre. The CEs that did not break even were placed on properties with an average 
before value of $233,760.87 per acre, with is around $75,000 higher than the sample 
average. An independent samples t-test for the shows that the p-value is less than 0.0001, 
meaning there is a 0.01% chance that the difference in the averages between the two 
categories of CEs is due to chance. 
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 As mentioned before in Table 18, both the properties with positive and negative 
CEs lost an about equal amount of value when the CE was placed. However, the 
properties at least broke even started at a lower before value than the CEs that did not. 
One of the potential reasons for this could be because the properties with a more 
expensive before value are better suited for development and have less ecological values 
overall. If a property is a vast empty space with no trees, wetland, or body of water then 
there are less construction costs associated with development. However, land with a high 
conservation value may be more difficult to clear out for construction. Another 
reason may be the geographical location of the property. If a property is located in a city, 
for example, the benefit to development would likely be higher than development in a 
suburb. On top of that, it is not exactly easy to find luscious forests in between the 
skyscrapers in Chicago. However, if this is the reason that some of these CEs are not 
breaking even, then we should consider if it is worth overpaying to preserve ecological 
properties in an area where there is likely a shortage. 
Further research should go into the relationship between the appraisal’s before 
value and location or the property. Because of the size of this sample, I could not run this 
analysis without risking identifying confidential information for individual CEs. It is 
likely that the properties with a higher before value fell into a specific region with higher 
property costs and less valuable ecological features. I cannot make a shortcut policy 
suggestion based on before value because there are too many unknown variables. 
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Conclusion 
 When CEs function the way they are meant to, they serve as powerful tools for 
ecological conservation. However, because the corresponding income tax deductions are 
so generous, bad actors are attracted and they misuse society’s resources. Looking at a 
sample of 61 randomly selected syndicated CEs from the Atlantic Coast Conservatory, 22 
of these CEs have a positive present value while 39 do not. On average, $1 of lost income 
tax dollars gets $0.52 of ecological value per acre. The CEs that broke even tended to 
award less income tax dollars per acre, to be larger than the CEs that did not, they had at 
least 1 homesite, their most common previous best use is residential development, and 
they have a lower before value than the CEs that did not break even. 
 From a policy perspective, Congress should require the IRS runs an analysis on 
approved CEs for trends every decade to update the tax code. The trends in this dataset 
suggests that the tax code should be amended to require a minimum property size and a 
maximum award of tax dollars per acre. These policy shortcuts are based off of common 
features in CEs with a positive present value and would increase the likelihood of a CE at 
least breaking even. 
 The goal of offering a tax incentive for CEs is to incentivize these ecological 
protections, however, now the tax incentive has become the main focus of the 
conversation. The conversation around CEs should refocus on the ecological features we 
want to protect and on methods that can be used to place a monetary value on them. 
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Appendix 
 
Numbers Used from Exhibit 2 of Jessica Sargent-Michaud’s report with The Trust for 
Public Land 
Ecosystem 
Types Ecosystem Services 
Value 
per acre 
($2008) 
Value 
per acre 
($2020) Source 
Emergent 
Herbaceous 
Wetland 
 
Flood control, water supply; fish 
and 
wildlife habitat; recreation; 
aesthetics  
$784  $941.94 Roberts & 
Leitch, 1997 
Woody Wetland Flood control, water supply; fish 
and wildlife habitat; recreation; 
aesthetics 
$784 $941.94 Roberts & 
Leitch, 1997 
Deciduous 
Forest 
 
Grazing; carbon sequestration; 
habitat 
provision 
$879 $1,056.08 Ingraham & 
Foster, 2008 
Evergreen Forest Grazing; carbon sequestration; 
habitat 
provision 
$879 $1,056.08 Ingraham & 
Foster, 2008 
Mixed Forest 
 
Grazing; carbon sequestration; 
habitat 
provision  
$880  $1,057.29 Ingraham & 
Foster, 2008 
Open Water 
 
Fresh water regulation and supply; 
habitat provision  
$267  $320.79 Ingraham & 
Foster, 2008 
Agriculture  Aesthetics; crop production; grazing  $283  $340.01 Rosenberger 
& Walsh, 
1997 
Altered or 
Disturbed  
None  N/A N/A  
Oil/Mine/Quarry None  N/A N/A  
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An Example of The Grid Method Used to Estimate the Areas on the 61 Properties 
 
 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
Total: 283 
Open Area: 190  
Pond and Buffer (overlap): 29.5 
River and Buffer (overlap): 52.5 
Springhead: 11 
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